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1997 / Whren v. United States
I. [NTRODUCrION
The cars of today come equipped with various safety and precautionary devices.
The horn, hazard lights, seat-belts, and now air bags, are installed for extra pro-
tection. Even with all of these safety features, there is still one risk that cannot be
avoided-the police.
On June 10, 1996, the United States Supreme Court handed down its unanimous
decision of Whren v. United States.' Whren held that the reasonableness of a traffic
stop under the Fourth Amendment2 will be determined by a purely objective stan-
dard.3 The Court also held that any minor traffic violation can give a police officer
probable cause to stop a motorist.5 This holding effectively eliminates the pretext
issue,6 as well as any inquiry by a court into the arresting officer's subjective intent
with regard to traffic stops.
7
With the pretext issue gone, this Casenote argues that the Fourth Amendment no
longer affords meaningful protection from intrusive police searches while a person
is in a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court, in dicta, dismissed Whren's claims that
the low "objective" standard will be abused by the police to conduct unreasonable
searches as well as to allow the police the ability to harass minorities. 8 The Court
suggested that the Equal Protection Clause9 is available to protect minorities from
1. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
2. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
Id.
3. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
4. Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the officer's] knowledge and of which
[the officer] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925). But see Camara v. Municipal Court (San Francisco), 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (holding that in the
context of administrative searches, probable cause exists if the administrative reasons for conducting a search
outweigh an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy interests).
5. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775.
6. The pretext issue arises when the officer's reasons for using a specific Fourth Amendment power on a
particular occasion diverges from the reasons advanced by the courts for allowing such Fourth Amendment activity.
See John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 70, 124 n.36 (1982) (defining a "pretext arrest" as
one in which the arresting officer pretends to arrest for a proper reason, but is really arresting in order to conduct
a search incident tct arrest for which there is no independent probable cause); see also James B. Haddad, Pretextual
Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639,641 (1985) (asserting that where
a police officer is acting within the letter of the law, it is improper to focus upon the officer's specific motivations).
7. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
8. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (addressing Whren's argument that police officers will be able
to use the "could have" test to harass minorities).
9. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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such concerns. 10 However, this Casenote examines whether the shield of the Equal
Protection Clause is too limited in the traffic stop context to provide any meaningful
protection.'
This Casenote examines the case law dealing with searches and seizures that led
to the Whren decision 2 as well as the legal ramifications that will follow from this
decision. 3 Although concluding that the decision in Whren was consistent with the
precedent of the Supreme Court, this Casenote develops how the Court started down
the path of eliminating meaningful Fourth Amendment protection for motorists and
explores alternative approaches that could be used to avoid the likely consequences
of the Whren decision. 4
II. AUTOMOBILE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES LEADING TO WHREN
A. Early Search and Seizure Cases
Prior to Katz v. United States,5 the Supreme Court concluded that a search
would only be invalidated under the Fourth Amendment if the search had been a
physical intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area."' 6 In Katz, FBI agents had
placed an electronic listening and recording device on the outside of a public tele-
phone booth in order to eavesdrop on the defendant's conversation regarding illegal
wagering information. 7 Katz determined that the Fourth Amendment protection
reaches beyond individual privacy from government intrusion into areas that have
nothing to do with privacy at all.' s Therefore, the Court reasoned that inquiring into
whether an area is "constitutionally protected" did not really address the problem
because "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."' 9 The Court clarified
that the Fourth Amendment protects what a person "seeks to preserve as private,
even [if] in an area accessible to the public."20 Thus, the correct inquiry was not
whether a telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area, but whether the defen-
10. Whren, 116S. CLat 1774.
11. See infra Part IV.C. (analyzing whether the Equal Protection Clause affords protection to minorities with
regard to unreasonable searches and seizures in the traffic stop context).
12. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the Supreme Court precedent which paved the way for the Whren
decision).
13. See infra Part IV.A. (describing the possible effects of Whren on the future of automobile search and
seizure cases).
14. See infra Part V (setting forth a legislative solution to potential abuse under Whren).
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,512 (1961). A "constitutionally protected area" is one
of the areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment: "persons," "houses" "papers," and "effects." WAYNE R.
LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2. at 124 (2d ed. 1992).
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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dant had a reasonable expectation of privacy while using the telephone booth.21 The
Court concluded that the government's eavesdropping violated Katz's expectation
of privacy "upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth."22
Six months after Katz, the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio.23 Terry
analyzed whether a police officer could "stop"24 and "frisk ' '25 individuals without a
warrant when an officer suspects that individuals are involved in criminal activity.
26
In Terry, the arresting officer observed three men repeatedly look into a store as if
"casing" it for a robbery. 27 This observation led to the officer detaining the men and
patting them down for weapons.'2 After balancing the need of a police officer to be
protected in potentially dangerous situations against the invasion which the search
entails, the Court held that there must be authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons when the officer "has reason t6 believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual."29 In order to justify a particular intrusion, the police officer
must be able to point to a reasonably articulated suspicion from the facts which war-
rant the intrusion.30
B. The Automobile Cases
Cases such as Katz and Terry set forth the basic guidelines to determine permis-
sible searches and seizures. Even before these two cases, the Supreme Court had
determined that there was a difference between the search of a structure and the
search of an automobile?' In Carroll v. United States, the Court recognized that a
vehicle could be quickly moved from a locality where an arrest was made? 2 The
Court held that this characteristic permitted a warrantless search of a vehicle upon
21. Id. at 361 (Harlan. J., concurring).
22. Id. at 353.
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. A "stop" was defined as briefly detaining an individual for questioning upon suspicion that the
individual may be involved with criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. The Court held that a "stop" could not
be distinguished from a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 16.
25. The term "frisk" was used to describe a pat-down of a suspect to check for weapons. Id. at 10. The Court
determined that a "frisk" also could not be distinguished from a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 16-
17.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 6-7.
29. Id. at 27.
30. Id. at 21; see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (holding that, after lawfully ordering
the defendant out of his vehicle following a stop foratraffic violation, a bulge in the defendant's jacket "permitted
the officer to conclude that [the defendant] was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the officer,"
and that a "pat-down" search of the defendant was therefore justified); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882,
886 (1997) (concluding that police, having lawfully stopped a vehicle, may order the occupants to exit the vehicle).
31. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
32. Id. at 153.
598
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probable cause of a crime in order to find evidence of that crime.33 Aside from
allowing a warrantless evidence search, prior to 1973, the Court had not yet deter-
mined the permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile and its
occupants.
On December 11, 1973, the Supreme Court decided two cases which set the
standards for the future of automobile search and seizure cases.34 The first of these
cases was United States v. Robinson.35 In Robinson, the arresting officer executed a
full search of the defendant's person after arresting him for driving without a valid
driver's license.36 During this search the officer felt an object in the defendant's left
breast pocket which the officer knew was not a weapon, but which he could not
identify.37 Removing the object, the officer found that it was a crumpled up cigarette
package.38 Upon searching its contents, he found fourteen gelatin capsules containing
heroin. 9 The Court held that when an officer has probable cause to arrest a motorist
and has effected a full custodial arrest,4° a permissible search of the defendant's per-
son without a search warrant could include the inspection of packages found on a
suspect's person as well as the seizure of items found within the packages even if the
items found were not related to the reason for the initial stop.4' The Court reasoned
that there is a danger to a police officer when the officer makes an arrest.42 The Court
recognized that not only is there a need to preserve evidence discovered on the
suspect's person, but also that there is a need to disarm the suspect to ensure the
officer's safety.43
33. Id.; see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985) (opining that the warrant exception for
automobiles is also applicable to a motor home because a motor home is readily mobile and because there is a
reduced expectation of privacy due to the fact that it is subject to regulations inapplicable to dwellings).
34. See John K. Sutherland, Searches of the Person Incident to Traffic Arrests: State and Federal
Approaches, 26 HASINGS L.J. 536,537 (1974) (stating that Robinson and Gustafson were the first cases in which
the Supreme Court ruled on the permissible scope of a search of a person incident to arrest for a traffic violation).
35. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
36. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220-22.
37. Id. at 223.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. A "full custody arrest" is an arrest in which an officer arrests a person and subsequently transports that
person to a police facility for booking. Id. at 223 n.2.
41. Id. at 235-36; see United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1993) (opining that because the
custodial arrest of the defendants for a mere traffic infraction was invalid, the search of the defendants should not
have been exempted from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to arrest); United
States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 991 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding that because the arrest of the defendant, a suspected
drug courier, in an airport by Drug Enforcement Administration agents was lawful, a search of the defendant's bag
incident to his arrest was likewise valid); United States v. Polito, 583 F.2d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the
apprehension of a parolee is a "custodial arrest" and evidence seized during the course of a search of the parolee
is admissible).
42. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
43. Id.; see Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,236 (1960) (holding that Immigration and Naturalization
Service agents acted lawfully when they searched through the defendant's belongings in his hotel room looking for
weapons and documents to evidence his "alienage" after making a valid administrative arrest). But see Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20,30-31 (1925) (determining that a search of the defendant's house, several blocks from
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The traffic violation in Robinson, driving without a valid license, carried a man-
datory jail term and fine in the District of Columbia." Under these circumstances, the
officer had no discretion whether to arrest the defendant; an arrest was mandatory.45
Thus, the valid arrest based on probable cause gave the officer the right to execute
a search incident to that arrest.6
The other automobile search and seizure case decided on December 11, 1973,
was Gustafson v. Florida.4 7 The facts and holding of Gustafson are essentially the
same as Robinson with one difference. In Gustafson, the defendant was arrested for
driving an automobile without a valid operator's permit in his possession.48 Florida
law gave the arresting officer the discretion whether to effect a full custodial arrest
of, or simply to issue a ticket to, Gustafson.49 The effect of the Gustafson holding is
to allow police officers the right to search the entire person of an arrestee and the
contents of any items found whenever it is within the officer's discretion to make a
full custodial arrest50
Six years after Robinson and Gustafson, the Supreme Court's decision in
Delaware v. Prouse5l seemed to reassure the country that the Fourth Amendment
was still a viable protection for drivers against unreasonable searches and seizures.
5 2
In Prouse, the defendant was arrested for the possession of marijuana which was in
plain view5 3 of the arresting officers 4 However, the officer testified that he had
the site of the arrest, was not a search incident to the arrest).
44. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
45. Id. at 221 n.1.
46. Id. at 224.
47. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
48. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 262.
49. Id. at 263.
50. See Sutherland, supra note 34, at 548 (asserting that the Gustafson Court "found affirmative authority
to uphold searches limited only by the [police officer's] discretion").
51. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
52. See Vicki G. Golden, Search Incident to Arrestfor Traffic Violation, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401, 413-14
(1974) (asserting that Rdbinson and Gustafson purport to leave the exclusionary rule intact, but, in fact, deny the
availability of the rule to all persons subject to a search incident to a custodial arrest); Sutherland, supra note 34,
at 537 (suggesting that Robinson and Gustafson substantially diluted the protections which the Fourth Amendment
is supposed to provide by authorizing "the police to conduct a 'no-holds-barred' search after any custodial arrest"),
53. The Court has explained that the "plain view" doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items
when the officer is 'lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen" and when the officer had
a "lawful right of access to the object itself." Horton v. California. 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990); see id. (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view, even if the discovery
of the evidence was not inadvertent). The Court reasoned that if an article is already in plain view, neither its
observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
(finding that although a stereo was in plain view, the officer's actions in moving the stereo to locate its serial
numbers constituted a search which had to be supported by probable cause since the serial numbers were not in
plain view). In Prouse, the marijuana was sitting on the car floor which could be seen by the officer while standing
outside the car. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650.
54. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650.
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neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicions5 to stop the vehicle, but that he
stopped the vehicle in order to check the driver's license and registration. 'The Court
held that stopping a vehicle and detaining the driver in order to check the driver's
license and registration, without reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or
that the automobile is not registered, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.5 7
The Court explained that although the use of automobiles is heavily regulated, the
use of an automobile does not open the door for unlimited government intrusion.
58
Further, the Court noted that there was no empirical evidence that making random
stops in order to apprehend unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles would be an
effective means of promoting roadway safety.59 In addition, the Court stated that an
individual does not lose all expectations of privacy simply by using an automobile
which is subject to state regulation.O
Two years after Prouse, the Court gave more search power to arresting officers
with New York v. Belton.61 In Belton, the officer had probable cause to stop the
defendant's vehicle because of the driver's excessive speed.62 When the officer stop-
ped the vehicle, he smelled marijuana emanating from the car's interior and found
that none of the occupants owned the vehicle!' Once the officer had all of the
occupants outside and away from the vehicle, he went back and searched the driver
and passenger compartments. 64 During this search, the officer found cocaine in the
pocket of the defendant's jacket which was in the back seat of the automobile. 65 The
Court adopted a "bright line" rule holding that when a police officer has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile, the officer may search the
passenger compartment of the vehicle and may also examine the contents of any
55. "Reasonable suspicion" exists when an officer "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968);
see Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE LJ. 214, 216 (1983) (asserting that
probable cause is a more demanding standard to meet than reasonable suspicion because the former reaches only
completed or ongoing crimes, while the latter encompasses imminent criminal activity).
56. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650.
57. Id. at 663.
58. Id. at 662-63.
59. Id. at 659. But see Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that a
highway sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the State's interest in
preventing drunk driving, the extent to which the system can advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon
individual motorists who were briefly stopped weighed in favor of the state program).
60. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662.
61. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
62. Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
63. Id. at 455-56.
64. Id. at 456.
65. Id.
66. The Court noted that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "can only be realized if the police are
acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand
as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interests of law enforcement." Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R.
LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP.
Cr. REV. 127, 142).
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container found within the passenger compartment.67 The Court reasoned that a
lawful custodial arrest justifies a contemporaneous warrantless search of the person
and of the immediate surrounding area because of the need to remove any weapons
that the arrestee might seek to use to resist arrest or effect escape, as well as to
prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.
The holding of Belton seemed to contradict the holding of Chimel v. California, 69
which had been decided twelve years earlier. 0 In Chimel, the Court limited a search
incident to an arrest to the defendant's person and the immediate area from which the
defendant might obtain a weapon or tamper with evidence!' The contents of the
driver and passenger compartments in a vehicle may consist of an area within a
defendant's control under the Chimel test.7 2 Because the defendant in Belton was
outside the vehicle and no longer had access to the area within the car, the search in
Belton should have been invalidated under Chimel. Belton evidenced the Court's
willingness to allow broad discretion to police officers to conduct searches in auto-
mobile cases.73
After Belton was decided, a police officer had the right to search: (1) The person
arrested; (2) any items found on the arrestee's person; (3) the entire passenger com-
partment of a vehicle once probable cause to arrest the occupants of that vehicle was
established; and (4) closed containers, including luggage, found within the passenger
compartment. 4 One issue that remained was what would give police the initial
probable cause to stop a vehicle which may lead to such a search.
67. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61; see California v. Acevedo. 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that a police
officer may conduct a warrantless search of a container found in an automobile even if the officer lacks the requisite
probable cause to search the vehicle as a whole when the officer has probable cause to believe that the container
itself is holding contraband or evidence).
68. Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,763 (1969)).
69. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
70. See Steven M. Hartmann, Search and Seizure, 70 ILL. BJ. 722,722 (1982) (asserting that "the Belton
bright-line rule represents a departure from the underlying justifications for the Chimel exception to the search
warrant requirement").
71. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
72. See Hartmann, supra note 70, at 724 (suggesting that the lower courts must determine whether a
container is within the arrestee's control).
73. See Deborah L Fries, Privacy Rights v. Law Enforcement Difflculties: The Clash of Competing Interests
in New York v. Belton, 59 DEN. U. L. REv. 793, 807 (1982) (arguing that Belton expands the scope of a search
incident to arrest at the expense of privacy interests because under Belton any container within the driver and
passenger compartment can be lawfully searched); Hartmann, supra note 70, at 724 (opining that Belton should
have required that lower courts strictly adhere to the basic Chimel principles because the Chimel principles "would
have focused the attention of lower courts and police officers on the exigencies which justify this search warrant
exception").
74. See supra notes 35-46, 47-50, 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of Robinson,
Gustafson, and Belton respectively).
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C. The Tests
Prior to Whren, there were two competing tests that courts used to determine
whether a police officer had probable cause to stop a vehicle under the Fourth
Amendment: the "would have" test and the "could have" test. 5
1. The "Would Have" Test
Under the "would have" test, a stop was valid only if under the same circum-
stances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of any pre-
textual purpose.76 For example, suppose a police officer was following a motorist,
who the officer believed to be a drug dealer, and observed the motorist change lanes
without signaling. Under the "would have" test, the inquiry is whether a reasonable
officer would have stopped the motorist for changing lanes without signaling absent
the desire to gain the opportunity to find evidence of drug-related activity. Courts that
applied this test inquired not only into the legality of the stop, but also into its con-
formity with regular police practices.7 These courts reasoned that the "would have"
test provided useful judicial review of discretionary police actions and still preserved
the requirement of an objective inquiry into Fourth Amendment activity.8 By
inquiring into what a "reasonable" officer would do, the test preserves the objective
inquiry requirement of the Fourth Amendment? 9 In addition, by exploring what a
reasonable officer would do, the test allows a standard which enables a court to detect
any pretextual activity on the officer's part.80 By the time Whren was decided, only
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits used the "would have" test!'
75. See Andrew . Pulliam, Developing a Meaningful Fourth Amendment Approach to Automobile
Investigatory Stops, 47 VAND. L. REV. 477,483 (1994) (characterizing the "substantial split of authority among the
federal courts" regarding the "would have" and "could have" tests as reflecting "the confusion surrounding the issue
of pretextual investigatory stops").
76. See United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472,476 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that a reasonable officer would
have stopped the defendant for driving with a suspended license even without information about the defendant's
drug trafficking); cf United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (establishing that the fact that two
men from out of state were driving in accordance with all traffic regulations and chose not to look at the state
trooper in a marked police car did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of drug activity to warrant the trooper to
stop the vehicle, and that a reasonable officer would not have stopped the men).
77. Cannon, 29 F.3d at 475.
78. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (declaring that if officers rarely stop
seat belt law violations without some other reason to stop a vehicle, lack of objective facts of commission of a more
serious crime makes the stop unconstitutionally pretextual), overruled by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d
783 (10th Cir. 1995).
79. See Smith, 799 F.2d at 710 (asserting that the "would have" test's focus on the objective reasonableness
of a police officer, rather than on subjective intent or theoretical possibility, is fully consistent with Supreme Court
precedent).
80. Id. at 708.
81. See supra note 76 (giving examples of Ninth and Eleventh Circuit decisions which used the "would
have" test).
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Although the "would have" test is arguably an objective one, when a court
determines if the officer acted reasonably, the test steps into a subjective stance and
looks to the officer's motives.82 This subjective inquiry, arguably, goes against the
language of the Fourth Amendment. 3 Courts believed that by suppressing any
evidence seized after a lawful stop if a reasonable officer would not have made the
stop,84 the "would have" test avoided arbitrary police action and prevented abuse of
discretion.as This test did not limit the "reasonableness" inquiry to whether the stop
was made with an improper motive.86 Thus, this test could lead to the suppression of
evidence even when there was no pretextual motive.87
The Tenth Circuit recently abandoned the "would have" test after determining
that its application had been "inconsistent and sporadic" and essentially unwork-
able. The court explained that, in applying the "would have" test, the court, at
times, had measured stops against the practices of the entire state's police force,89 at
other times against the practices of a particular unit.' and at other times against the
practices of the individual officer that made the stop.9'
82. See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 886 n.1 (4th Cir. 1992) (Luttig, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (referring to the "would have" test as a "subjective" standard because the test invalidates
"objectively reasonable law enforcement actions if... the law enforcement officer is deemed to have acted out of
pretextual motives").
83. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,97 (1964) (suggesting that if an officer's subjective intent was the test,
"the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects,' only in the discretion of the police") (quoting the Fourth Amendment of the Consti-
tution). But see New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,716-17 n.27 (1987) (emphasizing that there was no reason to
believe that the administrative search of the defendant's automobile junkyard was actually a pretext for obtaining
evidence of the defendant's violation of New York penal laws).
84. See Smith, 799 F.2d at 712 (holding that the officer's justification of stopping the defendant based on
a drug courier profile was unreasonable because a reasonable officer would not have made the stop, and, therefore,
ordering the suppression of the cocaine found in the defendant's car following the unreasonable stop).
85. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (explaining courts' reasons for using the "would have"
test).
86. See Rusher, 966 F.2d at 888 (Luttig, L., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that under
the "would have" test, even if an officer proved that the decision to stop a motorist was not pretextual, the officer
must still show that other reasonable officers would have made the stop).
87. Id.
88. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783,786 (10th Cir. 1995) (overruling United States v. Guzman,
864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988)).
89. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518 (asserting that the district court did not have enough information about
general police practices to apply the "would have" test).
90. See United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1994) (asserting that evidence of the
arresting officer's habit of making stops for violation of a window tinting law more often than his counterparts may
show that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop).
91. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 1004, 1006 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the fact that an arresting
officer routinely stopped vehicles for pulling away from the curb without signaling made the stop "business as
usual").
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2. The "Could Have" Test
Under the "could have" test, "an alleged pretextual stop is valid as long as the
officer "could have" stopped the car in question because of a suspected traffic vio-
lation." 92 The majority of the circuits which use this test "simply ask (1) whether the
arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was committing a traffic
offense and (2) whether municipal law authorizes a stop for such an offense." 93 This
test was more widely accepted than the "would have" test at the time Whren was
decided.94 Courts which follow the "could have" test reason that if the stop was
objectively legal, the excusionary rule95 should not be used to suppress evidence
since it was designed to deter unlawful police actions.
96
The problem with the "could have" test is that it takes away some of the Fourth
Amendment's protection.97 The "could have" test allows arbitrary, discriminatory,
92. Whren v. United States, 53 F.3d 371,374 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aft'd 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996); see United
States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the police officers were authorized to stop the
defendant after observing the defendant change lanes without signaling which is a state traffic law violation), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993) (determining that the
police officers had probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle after observing that the defendant failed to stop
at an intersection), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994).
93. United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472,475 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the arresting officers
in three separate stops had probable cause to stop the defendants after observing violations of Illinois traffic
regulations including changing lanes without signaling, driving with a cracked windshield and crossing over the
white fog line on the shoulder of the highway, and driving with an air freshener hanging from the rear-view mirror);
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the inquiry for determining the
reasonableness of a traffic stop is whether the "particular officer had reasonable suspicion that [the] particular
motorist violated 'any one of the multitude of applicable traffic' ... regulations of the jurisdiction") (quoting
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)); Scopo, 19 F.3d at 782-84 (holding that the police officers were
authorized to stop the defendant after observing the defendant change lanes without signaling which is a state traffic
law violation); United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the state trooper had a
legitimate basis for stopping the defendant's van after observing the defendant change lanes without signaling, and
that the stop was, therefore, reasonable); Hassan El. 5 F.3d at 730 (determining that the police officers had probable
cause to stop the defendant's vehicle after observing that the defendant failed to stop at an intersection).
95. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that to admit evidence illegally seized
by federal officers would put a stamp of approval on their unconstitutional conduct); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is inadmissible in state court).
96. For instance, in United States v. Causey, the police executed a seven-year-old arrest warrant for the
defendant's failure to appear in court on a misdemeanor charge in order to gain the opportunity for custodial
interrogation of the defendant regarding a bank robbery for which the defendant was a suspect. United States v.
Causey, 818 F.2d 354, 355-56, rev'd en bane, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit held that because
the arrest of the defendant was pretextual in order to obtain a confession, the deterrent rationale of the Fourth
Amendment would not be served unless the confession was suppressed. Id. at 362.
97. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (explaining that "[t]he essential purpose of the
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion
by government officials, including law enforcement agents in order to safeguard the privagy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions"); see also William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of
Police Discretion, 17 U. MIcH. J.L REFoRM 551, 553 (1984) (asserting that "[e]ven when the governmental interest
at stake might otherwise justify a search or seizure, that search or seizure may be illegal if allowing it would confer
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or abusive searches based on trivial violations.98 In addition, unlike the "would have"
test, the "could have" test does not protect motorists against pretextual stops 9
Although the "could have" test can be better justified under the Fourth Amendment
than the "would have" test because of the "could have" test's purely objective in-
quiry, the "could have" test destroys the same part of the Constitution that gives it
life with its low standard for "reasonableness."'0° However, the debate between the
circuits regarding the "would have" and "could have" tests was settled on June 10,
1996, when the United States Supreme Court decided Whren v. United States.'0'
m. WHREN V. UNITED STATES
A. The Facts
On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice squad officers Efrain Soto,
Jr., and Homer Littlejohn, and Investigator Tony Howard, members of the District
of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, were patrolling a high drug activity
area of the city in an unmarked car.'0 The officers spotted a dark Nissan Pathfinder
with two young African-American males inside. 03 The Pathfinder was stopped at a
stop sign for what seemed an unusually long time, more than twenty seconds, and
was obstructing the traffic behind it.' 4 Officer Soto observed the driver, Brown,
looking down at the lap of the passenger, Whren. s05 As the officers made a U-turn
in order to follow the truck, the Pathfinder made a right turn without signaling and
sped off at an unreasonable speed.1' 6
The officers pulled along side the Pathfinder when it stopped at a red light. 07
Officer Soto identified himself as a police officer as he approached the driver's side
too broad a discretionary authority on the police").
98. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the "could have" test makes a whole more than a sum of its parts, meaning that the police combine
insufficient constitutional bases to produce a constitutionally acceptable arrest, such as an arbitrary execution of
a warrant added to a suspicion that does not amount to probable cause).
99. See United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064,1065 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that under the "could have"
test, the chance that a court would discover pretextual seizures was virtually eliminated); supra note 6 (explaining
the "pretext issue").
100. See Pulliam, supra note 75, at 526-29 (suggesting that a solution to the "would have"I"could have" test
debate is a new test which encompasses both tests and would: (I) Preserve the pretext doctrine, (2) permit a court
to differentiate between legal and fabricated pretexts, (3) require limited judicial resources, (4) allow police
departments to easily understand and apply the test, and (5) permit application of the good faith doctrine).
101. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
102. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371,372 (D.C. Cir. 1995). aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
103. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
104. Whren, 53 F.2d at 372.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
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of the Pathfinder and directed the driver, Brown, to put the vehicle in park. °8 When
Officer Soto reached the driver's side window, he observed the passenger, Whren,
holding two plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine.' °9 Soto yelled
"C.S.A." to notify the other officers that he had observed a Controlled Substance Act
violation." ° As Soto reached for the driver's side door, he heard Whren yell "pull off,
pull off," and observed Whren pull the cover off of a power window control panel
and put one of the bags inside a secret compartment."' Officer Soto then opened the
door, dove across Brown, and grabbed the other bag from Whren's hand." 2 Officer
Littlejohn pinned Brown to the back of the driver's seat so that Brown could not
move."
3
After arresting Brown and Whren, the officers searched the Pathfinder at the
scene." 4 The officers recovered marijuana laced with PCP, a bag of crack cocaine,
and a large white rock of crack cocaine from the hidden compartment on the pas-
senger side door." s The officers also seized numerous unused zip-lock bags, a
portable phone, and personal papers"
16
Brown and Whren were charged with violating various drug laws in a four-count
indictment." 7 At trial, Whren argued that, at the time of the stop, the officers did not
have probable cause, or even a reasonable suspicion, that the defendants were
engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity."8 Whren asserted that the officers' reasons
for stopping the vehicle were pretextual and were based on the fact that Brown and
Whren are African-Americans." 9
Officer Soto testified that his reason for stopping the Pathfinder was that the
driver was "not paying full time and attention to his driving."'20 Soto also testified
that he did not intend to issue a ticket to the driver for stopping too long at the stop
sign, but that he wished to inquire why the driver was obstructing traffic and why he
sped off without signaling in a school area.' 2' Soto stated that the decision to stop the
108. Id.
109. Id.







117. The four count indictment consisted of: (1) Possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more
of cocaine base, or crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); (2) possession with the
intent to distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); (3) possession of
a controlled substance (marijuana) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and (4) possession of a controlled substance
(phencyclidine ("PCP")) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (a). Id. at 372.




1997/ Whren v. United States
defendants' Pathfinder was not based on the "racial profile"'22 of the occupants, but
rather on the actions of the driver.1
B. The District Court
Despite Whren's arguments that the traffic stop was pretextual, the district court
denied Whren's motion to suppress the physical evidence.124 At this time, the D.C.
Circuit had already adopted the "could have" test.'25 In United States v. Mitchell, the
D.C. Circuit determined that the Fourth Amendment did not preclude the police from
"stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of
traffic laws, even if the offense [was] a minor one." 126 The Mitchell court explained
that in determining the legitimacy of police conduct under the Fourth Amendment,
a court must look to objective circumstances rather than to an officer's state of
mind.' 27 Following these standards, the district court in Whren concluded that "the
government [had] demonstrated through the evidence presented that the police con-
duct was appropriate and, therefore, there [was] no basis to suppress the evidence." 
2
The district court noted that there was nothing to demonstrate that the actions of the
officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop.129 After trial, Whren was convicted
on all four counts of his indictment. 3°
C. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, Whren argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the physical evidence under the Fourth Amendment.' 3' Specifically, Whren
contended that even if an objective circumstances test was used [i.e., the "could
122. A "racial profile" stop is a stop in which a police officer chooses to stop a vehicle based on the race of
the vehicle's occupants in order to search for drugs since race has been used as a factor in drug courier profiles. See
Brief for Appellant at 27-28, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841) [hereinafter Appellant's
Brief].
123. Whren, 53 F.3d at 373.
124. Id.
125. See United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that after the police officer
observed the defendant turn without signaling and speeding, the officer had probable cause to stop the motorist even
though the officer had not decided whether to cite the defendant for the violations).
126. Id. at 1295.
127. Id. (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,584 n.3 (1983)); see id. (upholding the
stop of a boat for registration inspection even though the arresting officers intended to search for drugs); see also
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (determining that an officer's intent does not invalidate a search
as long as the objective circumstances justify that action).
128. Whren, 53 F.3d at 373.
129. Id.
130. For the four counts, Whren received a 30-year prison sentence and 17 years of supervised release. Id.
Whren was also fined $8800 for each count, and was charged a special assessment of $150. Id.
131. Id. at 374-76.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 28
have" test], the stop was not justified because "its intrusiveness far outweighed any
legitimate governmental interest in acting contrary to established police practices."''
32
Whren urged the court to adopt the "would have" test used by the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits. 3 The court, instead, applied the "could have" test.'34 Relying on
D.C. Circuit precedent, the court reasoned that under the Fourth Amendment, once
a police officer witnesses or suspects a violation of traffic laws, even if the offense
is a minor one, the officer may stop and question the motorist. 35 Under the court's
analysis, "witnessing" or "suspecting" a violation provided the probable cause or
reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment to stop Whren's vehicle.
36
The court further justified the "could have" test by asserting that it provides a
more principled way for determining the reasonableness of a stop.137 The court cited
two reasons for this assertion. First, the "could have" test eliminates the necessity of
inquiring into an officer's subjective state of mind. 38 This follows the Supreme
Court's holding that Fourth Amendment inquiries depend "on an objective assess-
ment of the officers' actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him
at the time... and not on the officer's actual state of mind." 39 Second, the test limits
abuse of power by the police because the police cannot stop a vehicle "unless they
have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or a reasonable
suspicion of unlawful conduct based upon articulable facts."
' 40
The court commented that the duties of the officer as assigned by the police
department are irrelevant as long as there is an objective legal basis to make the
stop. 4 Thus, it was irrelevant that Officers Soto and Littlejohn were undercover vice
squad officers who were not assigned the duty to cite motorists for traffic vio-
lations. 142 When the officers observed the defendant's violation of traffic laws, "they,
132. Whren argued that because the officers acted contrary to police procedure, stopped the defendants in
an unmarked car, were undercover agents, and only stopped the defendants for not paying full time and attention
to the road, the intrusiveness of the stop outweighed any legitimate governmental interest in making the stop.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 122, at 37.
133. Whren, 53 F.3d at 374; see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (developing the theory behind the
"would have" test and discussing cases from these circuits).
134. Whren, 53 F.3d at 375.
135. Id.; see United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (asserting that "[tihe Fourth
Amendment does not bar the police from stopping and questioning motorists when [the officers] witness or suspect
a violation of traffic laws, even if the offense is a minor one"); United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 880
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that "[elven a relatively minor offense that would not itself lead to an arrest can
provide a basis for a stop for questioning and inspection of [a] driver's permit and registration").
136. Whren, 53 F.3d at 376.
137. Id. at 375.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,470-71 (1985)). In Maryland v. Macon, the Court held
that the police "officer's action in entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were intentionally exposed
to all who frequent the [bookstore] did not infringe a legitimate expectation of privacy and hence did not constitute
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Macon, 472 U.S. at 469.
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as officers of the law, were constitutionally justified in stopping the appellants. ' 43
The court concluded that the district court properly denied Whren's motions to
suppress the evidence. 144
D. The Supreme Court
1. Whren's Arguments
Whren presented several arguments to the Supreme Court, all centering around
the contention that the stop in question was unreasonable and, therefore, in violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights. 45 Whren first argued that by allowing a mere
observation of any technical traffic violation to justify a pretextual traffic stop, the
"could have" test failed to prevent arbitrary and unreasonable seizures because with
the existence of hundreds of minor traffic regulations the police possess exceedingly
broad discretion to stop a motorist. 146 Whren contended that, in this context, the
"reasonableness" of a stop "requires more than the 'minimum' of individualized
suspicion of a [traffic] 'violation."' 47 In addition, Whren argued that "the ["could
have"] test applied by the D.C. Circuit... subjects motorists 'to unfettered govern-




In support of this argument, Whren stated that "[tihe essential purpose of the
proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment was to impose a standard of 'reasonableness'
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement
agents, in order 'to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions."",149 In addition, Whren argued that allowing the police to stop a motorist
after observing a violation of a minor traffic regulation could lead to unrestrained
authority to seize motorists.'5°Whren explained that because there are so many traffic
regulations, the police could always allege a breach of a minor civil traffic regu-
lation.'5 ' Further, Whren maintained that it is so unusual to drive in accordance with
all traffic regulations that some police officers consider it suspicious and have
attempted to use driving in accordance with all traffic regulations as a factor in a
"drug courier profile."'52 Whren predicted that the police would abuse this almost
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Appellant's Brief, supra note 122, at 14-49.
146. Id. at 15-29.
147. Id. at 17.
148. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).
149. Appellant's Brief, supra note 122, at 15 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
150. Id. at 17.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 19. A "drug courier profile" is a set of factors which a police officer relies on to evidence a drug
courier, e.g., age, time of travel, overly cautious, etc. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 707 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(finding that the state trooper's reliance on a drug courier profile to stop a vehicle did not justify stopping the
vehicle because the factors relied upon would likely apply to many of those traveling for perfectly legitimate
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limitless discretion and harass minorities under the "could have" test by stopping
minorities whenever an officer observes a minor traffic violation, even though that
officer has no reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity on the motorist's part.'
Whren reasserted his claim that a seizure based on a minor traffic infraction is
unreasonable if a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made
the stop."5 He contended that the "would have" test falls within the objective inquiry
standard of the Fourth Amendment, and explained that the test looks at "the objective
circumstances through the eyes of a 'reasonable officer,' not at the subjective state
of mind of the particular officer who made the stop."'
55
In support of his argument that a deviation from standard police practices is
unreasonable, Whren cited prior Supreme Court cases which stated that "[ilt is the
fact of the departure from the accepted way of handling such cases which makes the
officer's conduct arbitrary, and it is [this] arbitrariness which... constitutes the
Fourth Amendment violation.1 56 Whren explained that controlling arbitrary police
conduct lies in limiting police discretion, which entails a determination that police
action taken against one individual corresponds to action taken against another
similarly situated individual.57 Further, such a determination becomes more mea-
ningful if there are preexisting police regulations on the subject to establish standards
by which a court could measure the reasonableness of the officer's conduct.58
Finally, Whren argued that the Court should impose a balancing test to show that
the intrusiveness of the stop in question far outweighs any legitimate governmental
interest in acting contrary to established police procedure.' 59 Whren relied on
Delaware v. Prouse' to support his proposed balancing test. 61 Prouse clarified that
"the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
purposes).
153. Appellant's Brief, supra note 122, at 22-28.
154. Id. at 30.
155. Id. at32.
156. Id.; see United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983) (rejecting the defendant's
argument that customs officers could not rely on a statute allowing suspicionless boarding to inspect a vessel's
documentation because they were accompanied by state police and were following a tip that a vessel in the area was
carrying drugs); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.l (1973) (opining that the officer's placing the
defendant in custody after an arrest for operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his license was not a
departure from established police department practices because the offense carried a mandatory fine and/or
imprisonment); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,226 (1960) (finding that the use of an administrative warrant
for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case is a violation of the Fourth Amendment because "[tihe
preliminary stages of a criminal prosecution must be pursued in strict obedience to the safeguards and restrictions
of the Constitution and laws of the United States").
157. Appellant's Brief, supra note 122, at 36.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 37.
160. 440 U.S. 648 (1979); see supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Prouse case).
161. Appellant's Brief, supra note 122, at 37.
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of legitimate governmental interests."' 62 According to Whren, such a balancing test
in this case would show that the government's interest in allowing plainclothes police
officers in unmarked police cars to investigate minor traffic violations would be out-
weighed by the anxiety of an individual being stopped by a plainclothes police
officer.163
2. The Government's Arguments
The Government asserted that the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer
who witnesses a traffic violation to stop the motorist's vehicle.' 64 The Government
argued that any inquiry into whether a stop was pretextual is "inherently an inquiry
into [the officer's] subjective intent. ' 65 According to the Government, an inquiry
into the subjective intent of an officer is irrelevant in Fourth Amendment analyses.
166
The Government also contended that there is no requirement that an officer's
actions must conform to internal police practices when an action is otherwise valid
under the Fourth Amendment. 67 A "usual practices" standard "would generally be
simply.., an aggregation of the subjective intentions of officers in the regions [of
the nation].' 68 Such a standard would result in arbitrary police action because dif-
ferent departments and jurisdictions would have different practices. 69 Therefore, a
stop for a particular violation would be constitutional when carried out by an officer
in a police department whose regular procedure was to enforce all observed traffic
violations. 70 However, a similar stop when carried out in an identical fashion by an
officer in an adjoining jurisdiction whose police department had more specific en-
forcement priorities might be unconstitutional.' 7 '
The Government claimed that there was no need for a heightened Fourth Amend-
ment standard of justification in cases involving traffic stops. 72 According to the
Government, because automobiles are subject to such extensive regulation, an
162. Id. at 654; see supra note 59 (discussing the case of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz and
how the Court applied a balancing test to uphold a state's sobriety checkpoint).
163. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (1996).
164. Brief for Respondent, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841) [hereinafter
Respondent's Brief].
165. Id. at 15.
166. Id. at 13-14; see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) (asserting that "evenhanded law
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend
upon the subjective state of mind of the officer"); Graham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386, 397-99 (1989) (verifying that
the Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of objective reasonableness under the circumstances, and subjective concepts
have no place in that inquiry).
167. Respondent's Brief, supra note 164, at 16-25.
168. Id. at 22 (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993). cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
207 (1994)).
169. Respondent's Brief, supra note 164, at 23.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 25-27.
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operator of a motor vehicle must expect that the state will intrude, to some extent, on
that operator's privacy. 73 The Government further contended that "a motorist who
commits a traffic infraction has even less of an expectation of privacy."' 74 The
Government explained that motorists know that police stop and examine vehicles
without current registration stickers or if safety equipment is not properly working.' 75
Therefore, if motorists violate traffic regulations, they must know that they are sub-
ject to being stopped by the police.1
76
The Government asserted that the "would have" test was unworkable because it
"[was] difficult to apply, produce[d] inconsistent results, and provide[d] uncertain
guidance to officers in the field."' The necessity of looking at usual police practices
under the "would have" test is cumbersome and produces different results depending
on the jurisdiction in which a stop was made. 78 In addition, the need for police
officers to make split second decisions would be hindered due to confusion which
would be caused by the officer's need to determine whether another officer "would
have" stopped a vehicle based on the objective circumstances as analyzed by the
officer present.
79
Finally, the Government asserted that the stop in Whren was lawful and the
search reasonably limited in scope and manner because the officers had observed the
driver of the Pathfinder commit several traffic offenses which gave them the neces-
sary probable cause to make the stop.'8 Further, the scope of the search was rea-
sonably limited because Officer Soto remained outside of the Pathfinder until he saw
the cocaine in Whren's hands, which justified Officer Soto's entry into the vehicle
to retrieve the cocaine and apprehend the defendants."8'
3. The Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Whren began by explaining that an
automobile stop constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, the stop must not be "unreasonable" under the
circumstances. 2 The Court set forth the standard, which essentially is the "could
173. Id. at 26; see New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986) (holding that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle identification number); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
368 (1976) (clarifying that police officers stop and examine vehicles as an everyday occurrence, and therefore,
motorists understand that they may be stopped).
174. Respondent's Brief, supra note 164, at 26 (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 113).
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 30.
178. Id. at 31-32.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 39.
181. Id. at 41.
182. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
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have" test, that a "decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."'
83
The Court then rejected Whren's contention that the Supreme Court's past cases
supported the "would have" test.'8" According to Whren, past cases which involved
inventory searches t85 and administrative inspections t  showed that the Court
"disapprov[ed] of police attempts to use valid [constitutional] action against citizens
as pretexts for pursuing other investigatory agendas.""'  The Court, however, inter-
preted the cases relied on by Whren to show that the inventory search and
administrative inspection exceptions to the warrant requirement were only accorded
to searches that were made for administrative or inventory purposes. t88 The Court
went on to say that outside the context of inventory searches and administrative
inspections, its past cases have held that an officer's subjective motivations are
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. 8 9
183. Id.; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (determining that the "foremost method of en-
forcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations... is acting upon observed violations"); see also Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (finding that the police officer's decision to stop the defendant's vehicle for
driving an automobile with expired license tags was reasonable).
184. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
185. See id, at 1773 n.1 (explaining that an "inventory search" is the search of property lawfully seized and
detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items, and to protect against false claims of loss
or damage); see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (delineating that "an inventory search must not be a
ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence"); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372
(1987) (holding that in absence of a showing of bad faith, evidence discovered during an inventory search of the
defendant's van was admissible).
186. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 n.2 (defining an "administrative inspection" as the inspection of business
premises conducted by authorities responsible for enforcing a pervasive regulatory scheme); see also New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (setting forth the three criteria which must be met before a warrantless
administrative search will be deemed "reasonable": (1) "[A] 'substantial' governmental interest that informs the
regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made," (2) "the warrantless inspection must be 'necessary
to further [the] regulatory scheme,"' and (3) "'the statute's inspection program . . . [must] provide[] a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant") (last two changes in original) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594, 600, 603 (1981)); Camara v. Municipal Court (San Francisco), 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (holding that
warrants for housing inspections could be issued without the traditional quantum of case-by.case probable cause
if appropriate legislative or administrative standards for area or periodic inspections were met). This case
established that the Constitution imposed a lower requirement for administrative searches than it did for searches
in the course of a criminal investigation. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 47, at 98-
100(1995).
187. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773; see Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (delineating that "an inventory
search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence"); Burger, 482 U.S,
at 716-17 n.27 (finding that "the New York Legislature had proper regulatory purposes for enacting the
administrative scheme at issue and was not using it as a 'pretext' to enable law enforcement authorities to gather
evidence of penal law violations").
188. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
189. Id. at 1774. In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the Court held that customs officers could rely on
a statute allowing suspicionless boarding to inspect a vessel's documentation even though they were accompanied
by state police and were following a tip that a vessel in the area was carrying drugs. United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,584 n.3 (1983); see Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (noting that as long
as the objective circumstances justify the officer's action, the fact that the officer did not have the state of mind
which was hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action did not
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The Court also disagreed with Whren that the "would have" test is an "objective"
one.' tg The Court suggested that the "would have" test asks whether "it is plausible
to believe that the officer had the proper state of mind" for making the stop.' The
Court reasoned that the purpose of the "would have" test is to prevent pretextual
police activity and is, thus, "plainly and indisputably driven by subjective con-
siderations."' 92 In addition, the test would necessitate that courts look to police
manuals and standard procedures which would reduce issues to "speculating about
the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable-an exercise that might be
called virtual subjectivity."' 93 The Court agreed with the Government that the
differing police practices from jurisdiction to jurisdiction would cause the protections
of the Fourth Amendment to vary beyond an acceptable limit because different
practices and standards would bring different definitions of "reasonableness."'
94
The Court further disagreed with Whren that a balancing test should be em-
ployed in this case.' 95 The Court stated that "[t]he foremost method of enforcing
traffic and vehicle safety regulations.., is acting upon observed violations,"' 96 and
that observing such a violation gives an officer probable cause to stop a vehicle.197
The only cases in which the Court has found it necessary to perform a balancing test
involving searches and seizures based on probable cause are when the searches or
seizures have been "conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to the
individual's privacy or ... physical interests. ' '  The Court concluded that "[t]he
making of a traffic stop out-of-uniform does not qualify as such an extreme practice,
and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been
broken [always] 'outbalances' private interest in avoiding police contact."' 99
invalidate the action); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (indicating that it is the custodial arrest
which gives rise to the authority to search and that it is therefore irrelevant that the arresting officer did not show
any subjective fear of the defendant or that he did not suspect that the defendant was armed).
190. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774-75.
191. Id. at 1774.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1775.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1776-77.
196. Id. at 1776 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979)).
197. Id. at 1772.
198. Id. at 1776; see Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1919 (1995) (promulgating that although a search
or seizure of a dwelling might be unreasonable if police officers enter without prior announcement, law enforcement
interests, such as the preservation of evidence, may establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (using a balancing test to determine that a seizure by deadly force
against fleeing suspects is constitutionally unreasonable); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,766 (1985) (holding that
a physical penetration of the body to recover a bullet from the defendant's chest was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because the surgery required the defendant to be put under general anesthesia, the medical risks were
in dispute, and there was no need to recover the bullet in light of other available evidence); Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (mandating that "before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home
[without a warrant], the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries").
199. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
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The Court also addressed Whren's argument that because the use of automobiles
is so extensively regulated the police are able to single out almost anyone that they
wish to stop since it is virtually impossible for someone to observe all the traffic
laws.m The Court commented that it is "aware of no principle that would allow [it]
to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly vio-
lated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of
enforcement." 201
The Court did not address the issue that a purely objective test for determining
the reasonableness of a search and/or seizure may open the door for police to stop
vehicles based on the race of its occupants.2° According to the Court, "the con-
stitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of the laws
is the Equal Protection Clause,2°3 not the Fourth Amendment."
Although the Court never expressly adopted the "could have" test, it concluded
that "there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that probable
cause justifies a search and seizure." 5 Terefore, the Court upheld the defendants'
convictions by the district court.2 6
IV. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE WHREN DECISION
The Constitution of the United States was written over two hundred years ago.
The Whren decision may be evidence that the Framers could not plan for all modem
circumstances. Although the Bill of Rights, and later the Fourteenth Amendment,
were adopted in order to protect individuals' rights from government infringement,
the holding of Whren continues the stripping away of the constitutional protections
of individuals when they are in their automobiles.
A. No More Fourth Amendment Protection
That Whren strips away constitutional protection for people while in their auto-
mobiles is evident from the Court's holding which takes away from a driver any
meaningful Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable seizure when the driver has
done something as minor as changing lanes without signaling? According to
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1774; see supra note 153 and accompanying text (setting forth Whren's argument that the "could
have" test may be used by the police to harass minorities).
203. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
204. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774; see infra Part IV.C. (discussing how an equal protection claim might be an
inadequate avenue in traffic stop cases).
205. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 1777 (holding that when the police officers observed the defendant violate the traffic code,
the officers had probable cause to stop the vehicle).
616
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Whren, even an arbitrary decision to stop the vehicle based on a minor traffic
violation gives the officer probable cause to stop the vehicle?' 8
Such broad discretion awarded to the police opens the door for abuse and sends
the police the message that pretextual stops can be constitutional. For instance,
assume an officer believes that a motorist is engaged in drug dealing, but that the
officer's "belief" does not satisfy the probable cause or reasonable suspicion require-
ments. The officer then follows the motorist and observes the motorist changing
lanes without signaling, a city traffic law violation. The officer then has probable
cause to stop the motorist.29 Once the vehicle is stopped, the officer can then look
through the windows of the vehicle in order to spot evidence of illegal activity,2'0
speak to the occupants to gain reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, or look to state
law for the authority to make an arrest.2n If one of these elements is satisfied, the
officer can place the occupants under arrest and search the occupants as well as the
passenger compartment and any packages within the automobile.21 2 Thus, after
making a valid "Whren stop, 2 13 the Whren decision and its precedent allow the
police to turn a simple traffic stop into a search of the car and its occupants.
2 t4
According to Whren, the police officer in the hypothetical above did not violate
the occupants' constitutional rights. The officer had probable cause to stop the
vehicle and did not engage in a search until he had probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of a crime that would allow him to arrest the occupants. Once the officer
has legally arrested the occupants, then the officer may engage in a warrantless
search of the occupants, the driver and passenger compartments, and any containers
found within the car.
Prior to Whren, the defendants would at the minimum have an argument that the
stop was unreasonable, 215 and, therefore, the subsequent fruits of the search should
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing how officers may seize evidence which is in plain
view).
211. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (explaining the holding of Gustafson v. Florida which
allows officers to conduct a warrantless search of a motorist incident to arrest whenever it is within the officer's
discretion to arrest the motorist based on state law).
212. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the holding and effects of New York v.
Belton).
213. "Whren stop" is used here to describe a stop in which a police officer detains a motorist for violating
a minor traffic regulation in order to conduct an inquiry into possible criminal activity for which the officer has no
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
214. See supra Part I.B. (developing the line of cases which led to the Whren decision). The occupants may
be searched when a police officer has probable cause to believe that the occupants are involved in illegal activity.
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1981) (finding that the arresting officer smelled burnt
marijuana and had seen an envelope marked "Supergold" which the officer associated with marijuana and,
thereafter, placed the occupants of the vehicle under arrest for unlawful possession of marijuana).
215. For example, a motorist may have argued that the stop was pretextual. See United States v. Guzman,
864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (declaring that if officers rarely stop seat belt law violations without some
other reason to stop a vehicle, the lack of objective facts as to the commission of a more serious crime makes the
stop unconstitutionally pretextual), overruled by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
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be inadmissible 1 6 However, the holding of Whren eliminates this argument. If a
plain clothed police officer stops a motorist for changing lanes without signaling in
order to investigate the officer's feeling that the motorist is involved in illegal drug
activity, the motorist cannot claim that the initial stop was unconstitutional because
Whren allows stops to be made whenever a police officer observes a minor traffic
violation. If there is no valid argument that the initial seizure was unreasonable, as
long as the subsequent search was lawful, the motorist cannot argue that the "fruits"
of the search should be inadmissible. The subsequent search may be lawful if the
items seized were in plain view,17 if the search was conducted incident to arrest for
a traffic violation, or if the officer gained probable cause or reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity during the course of the stop and effected a search incident to
219arrest.
B. Whren's Confonnance to Precedent
Despite the seemingly controversial holding in Whren, the case can be supported
by prior cases of the United States Supreme Court. Examining the automobile Fourth
Amendment cases dating back to United States v. Robinson22° reveals the Court's
desire to allow broad discretion for police officers in traffic situations. 22' Although
some of the automobile cases arguably may not follow general Fourth Amendment
216. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (establishing the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine to describe inadmissible evidence which is discovered following unlawful police activity such as an illegal
search); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the doctrine of
"attenuation" as "attempt[ing] to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action
becomes so [diminished] that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost"); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,487 (1963) (declining to "hold that all evidence is the 'fruit of the poisonous tree'
simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police"); id. at 487-88 (proposing
that the exclusionary rule also has no application when "the Government learned of the evidence from an
independent source"); Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341 (establishing the doctrine of "attenuation" as an exception to the
"poisonous tree" doctrine).
217. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing how officers may seize evidence which is in plain
view).
218. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the line of Supreme Court cases which established the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
219. See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56 (finding that the arresting officer, after smelling marijuana upon
approaching the vehicle, had probable cause to arrest the vehicle's occupants for possession of a controlled
substance, and could thus effect a search of the driver and passenger compartments of the car as well as any
containers found therein when the officer's purpose for stopping the vehicle was for speeding).
220. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
221. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the United States Supreme Court cases that led to Whren); see also
Tracey Maclin, New York v. Class: A Little-Noticed Case with Disturbing Implications, 78 J. CRMI. L. &
CRIMINoLOGY 1,3 (1987) (asserting that in the context of routine traffic stops, the Court is willing "to grant police
the unfettered discretion to search [an] ... automobile where it is necessary to expedite law enforcement and
administrative functions, even if the police lack any objective justification for such an intrusion').
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precedent, -m the special problems posed by automobile cases can justify many of the
differences.m
Whren helps define the standard by which a police officer may lawfully stop a
vehicle 2 "4 The Court supported its decision to adopt the "could have" test not only
with policy arguments,2 but also based on its past cases.226 The Court analyzed the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry as it had in the past and determined that
"the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred.' '27 The Court also looked to past
cases for support that subjective intent alone does not invalidate otherwise lawful
conduct.t In addition, the Court used precedent in reasoning that an action by a
police officer will not be invalidated as long as the objective circumstances justify
the officer's action.tm Between the precedent that established these standards and the
fact that the "reasonableness" standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
inherently an objective standard, unsurprisingly the Court chose to adopt the "could
have" test and eliminate the pretext issue with regard to automobile stops.2°
A few cases have arguably used a subjective standard to determine the reason-
ableness of a Fourth Amendment search or seizure 31 However, it appears that these
222. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (analyzing the discrepancies between New York v. Belton
and Chimel v. Califonila).
223. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (determining that one has a lesser expectation
of privacy in an automobile because it is used for transportation and it is seldom used as one's residence or a place
to deposit one's personal effects); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (finding that the opportunity to
search an automobile is fleeting since the automobile is readily moveable); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
151 (1925) (recognizing that a difference between a search of a dwelling house, store, or other structure and an
automobile is that the automobile can be quickly moved).
224. See supra Part ll.C. (describing the "would have" and "could have" tests and the surrounding debate);
supra Part II.D.3 (discussing how the Court in Whren expressly rejected the "would have" test).
225. See supra notes 193-94, 200-201 and accompanying text (addressing the Supreme Court's policy
arguments in support of the "could have" test as including the ease of police in following the "could have" test and
that there is no need to distinguish among varying police practices in different jurisdictions with the "could have"
test).
226. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
227. Id.; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (determining that the "foremost method of
enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations ... is acting upon observed violations"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (finding that the police officer's decision to stop the defendant's vehicle for driving an
automobile with expired license tags was reasonable). But see supra note 4 (setting forth the different standards for
probable cause which the Court uses depending on the purpose of the search).
228. Whren, 116 S. CL at 1774; see Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (holding that the proper
approach for evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment is to objectively assess the officer's actions
in light of the circumstances confronting him at the time without regard to underlying motive or intent).
229. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774; see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,236 (1973) (holding that the
fact that the arresting police officer did not indicate any subjective fear of the defendant did not invalidate the
officer's search of the defendant because it was the custodial arrest which gave rise to the authority to search).
230. See supra Part II.C. (analyzing the "would have" and "could have" tests and concluding that the "could
have" test is the better test for ensuring an objective standard).
231. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,716-17 n.27 (1987) (emphasizing that there was no reason
to believe that the administrative search of the defendant's automobile junkyard was actually a pretext for obtaining
evidence of the defendant's violation of New York penal laws); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)
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cases only defined the limits of "reasonableness," and that the Court did not intend
that the arresting officer's subjective intent in making the arrest should be taken into
account in order to hold the search unreasonable and unconstitutional' 2 Similarly,
Whren can be construed to define the scope of reasonableness when holding that
following any observed traffic violation, a subsequent stop by a police officer is
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendmen03
That the Court's decision to adopt the "could have" test can be supported by pre-
cedent does not necessarily mean that the decision is correct. Although the "reason-
ableness" standard of the Fourth Amendment is inherently an objective standard, a
"reasonable" standard should not allow arbitrary and discriminatory police action.M
The problem with the Whren decision does not lie in that decision alone, but in the
line of cases leading to Whren as well. 35 Whren represents only one step in the
Court's process allowing broad discretion to the police and taking away protection
from individuals in the traffic stop contextY 6 Even prior to Whren, motorists did not
have strong Fourth Amendment protections once in their automobiles.3 7 If illegal
items were within plain view the officer could seize the items and arrest the motorist
for possession of the items. 38 Also, if the officer had probable cause to arrest the
motorist, the officer could seize any items found on the motorist's person or found
in the driver or passenger compartments of the motorist's vehicle.3 9 However, by
establishing such an easy standard of probable cause to stop a motorist, Whren makes
(finding that the police did not act "in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation" before approving an
inventory search).
232. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (setting forth the three criteria which must be met before a warrantless
administrative search will be deemed "reasonable:" (1) "[A] 'substantial' governmental interest that informs the
regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made," (2) "the warrantless inspection must be 'necessary
to further [the] regulatory scheme,'" and (3) "'the statute's inspection program... [must] provide[] a constitu-
tionally adequate substitute for a warrant"') (last two changes in original) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594,600,603 (1981)).
233. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
234. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the "could have" test makes a whole more than a sum of its parts, meaning that the police combine
insufficient constitutional bases to produce a constitutionally acceptable arrest, such as an arbitrary execution of
a warrant added to a suspicion that does not amount to probable cause).
235. See supra Part-Il.B. (analyzing the Supreme Court automobile cases that led to Whren).
236. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-63 (1981) (establishing the permissible scope of a
search of an automobile incident to the arrest of its occupants ); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (establishing the scope
of a search incident to arrest of the arrestee's person).
237. See supra Part IH.B. (discussing the automobile cases which led to Whren and the discretion allotted to
the police under those decisions).
238. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing how officers are able to seize evidence which is
within plain view).
239. See supra Part II.B. (discussing Supreme Court precedent which set forth the scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile and of a motorist).
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it easier for an officer to get to a position where the officer might see illegal items in
plain view or be able to arrest the motorist.?
°
C. The Equal Protection Clause Will Not Help
As a result of Whren, officers may use the decision's rule to continue to harass
minorities.24' Officers may harass minorities by stopping motorists simply because
of their race in order to question them.242 Although the officer may suspect that the
"minority" driver may be involved in illegal activity based on the driver's racial pro-
file,24 3 the officer can lawfully stop that motorist under Whren after the officer
observes a minor traffic violation.2" Because the reasonableness of a traffic stop
under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual motivations of the ar-
resting officer, the Court explained that a claim of selective enforcement of the law
based on race could not be brought under the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment.245 The Whren Court addressed this concern in passing by commenting that the
Equal Protection Clause would be the proper vehicle for such concerns. 246 Although
the Court suggested that the Equal Protection Clause is the proper vehicle for such
a concern, this clause will likely provide little assistance to minority defendants
alleging such harassment.
240. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777 (explaining that acting upon observed violations of traffic regulations justifies
a police officer in stopping a motorist).
241. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 122, at 22-26 (arguing that the "could have" test allows the police to
choose to stop a vehicle based on the color of one's skin by waiting until the driver violates a minor traffic
regulation). Police officers may use Whren to harass anyone, not only minorities, once a violation of a traffic
regulation is observed. See Whren, 116 S. CL at 1777.
242. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777; see also Johnson, supra note 55, at 225 (analyzing whether and when
race may be used as a factor in determining whether a police officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion in
order to detain an individual); id. at 226 (indicating that "[p]olice manuals often instruct officers to become familiar
with their beat and question persons who do not 'belong"); Joseph Green-Bishop, Black Frederick Attorney Uses
Courts to Battle Racism, DAILY RECORD, Jan. 16, 1993, at I (addressing the experience of an African-American
attorney who was "pulled over and charged by the local police for drunk driving, speeding, reckless driving, and
not wearing his seatbelt 17 times over a 10-year period"); Nancy Hill-Holtzman, Council OKs Curfew, 5-2, Amid
Protestfrom Youths, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at JI (illustrating the experiences of a young Latino man who was
stopped by the police countless times for resembling a robbery suspect, having a broken tail-light, or having too
many people in his car); Eric Slater, U.S. Probes Allegations of Racism by Torrence Police Law Enforcement, L.A.
TMaES, Jan. 16, 1995, at BI (addressing a lawsuit brought by two young African-American men who, just
celebrating their graduation from a Studio City prep school, were stopped in Torrence, "ordered from the car at
gunpoint, patted down and made to sit cross-legged on the sidewalk while two Torrence officers searched the car
for nearly an hour [with a result of] citations for a defective turn signal and a passenger not wearing a seatbelt, both
of which were later dismissed"); Jeffrey Tylicki, Long Beach Businessmen Seek $10,000 Apiece from City. L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1986, at BI (recounting the experience of two African-American men who were harassed at
gunpoint by police officers and security guards during a trip to Fashion Island mall because they were black).
243. See supra note 122 (explaining the significance of a "racial profile" and how it is used by the police).
244. See supra Part II.C.3. (explaining the holding of Whren).
245. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
246. Id.; see supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (describing the Court's response to Whren's fear
that the "could have" test will lead to harassment of minorities).
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As a hypothetical, suppose there is a traffic regulation which makes turning
without signaling a violation. An officer may lawfully stop a vehicle after the officer
observes that vehicle turn without signaling. Thus, the only claim that the occupants
of the vehicle could argue is that there has been a violation of their equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
With regard to an equal protection claim, the Court will give great discretion to
the state's legislature in enacting the traffic regulation unless the claimant can show
that the state has discriminated based on a racial classification.2 4 If a claimant can
overcome this hurdle, the Court will apply a strict scrutiny test,24' otherwise the
Court will apply a rational basis test.2 49
A person's right to be free from police detention has never been considered a
"fundamental interest ' 250 for equal protection purposesa 51 Therefore, in order to con
247. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (asserting that "the Equal Protection Clause demands that
racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny"); United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (intimating that a more stringent standard of review might
apply to statutes "directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities").
248. Under a strict scrutiny test, it must be shown that the statute in question is "necessary to the accomplish-
ment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate." Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)
(determining that the trial court's decision to award custody to the father only after the mother remarried an African-
American man could not be upheld under strict scrutiny even if it was in the best interest of the child because
private biases are outside of the scope of the law).
249. Under a rational basis test, a "legislative classification is [presumed] valid unless [it] bear[s] no rational
relationship to the State's objectives." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); see
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,590 (1979) (holding that the transit authority's decision to
not hire methadone patients was rational because of the authority's goal of ensuring passenger safety); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (finding that it is not a requirement of equal protection
"that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all" and, therefore, a New York traffic regulation
prohibiting the use of advertising vehicles, but permitting advertising on vehicles engaged in business, could not
be invalidated on equal protection grounds).
250. The Court has deemed there to be various fundamental interests in the first eight amendments of the Bill
of Rights which have been incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (finding a fundamental right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses per the Sixth
Amendment); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (holding that there is a fundamental interest in
the right to a speedy trial per the Sixth Amendment); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (delineating a
fundamental right to confrontation of opposing witnesses per the Sixth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 3 (1964) (delineating there to be a fundamental interest in the right to be free of compelled self-incrimination
granted by the Fifth Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (finding a fundamental interest
in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (finding a fundamental interest
in the Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have illegally obtained
evidence excluded from trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,257 (1948) (finding a fundamental interest in a public
trial per the Sixth Amendment); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927) (holding that there is a fundamental
interest in the speech, press, and religion rights granted by the First Amendment); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 240.41 (1897) (finding a fundamental right to compensation for property taken by the state
in the Fifth Amendment). In addition to these rights the Supreme Court has determined that there is a fundamental
interest in "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221-22 (1990) (holding that a mentally ill state prisoner possessed a significant liberty interest in avoiding an
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Carey
v. Population Senrs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (holding as fundamental the decision to bear or beget a child);
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vince a court to use a strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate a traffic regulation, a
petitioner must show a racially discriminatory purpose in enacting the regulation or
in the application of the regulation. 2
A petitioner will almost never be able to show that there was a discriminatory
purpose in enacting a traffic regulation.23 If the regulation in question makes turning
without signaling unlawful, such a regulation is facially neutral?- Unless a petitioner
is able to show that a certain class of minorities makes turns without signaling more
often than others, and that the legislature's motivation in enacting the regulation was
to discriminate against that minority group, it would be impossible to prove a dis-
criminatory purpose for a traffic safety regulation.25s
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (finding that decisions regarding family living
arrangements are fundamental rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (determining that there is
a fundamental right in the personal decision to use contraception); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (finding a fundamental
interest in decisions relating to marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (delineating that there
is a fundamental interest in decisions regarding procreation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding
a fundamental interest in decisions regarding child rearing and education). The Court has also determined that there
is a fundamental interest in the right to vote, the right to use the courts, and the right of interstate migration. See
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,380-81 (1971) (holding that the plaintiff's fundamental right to use the courts
was violated when the state denied the plaintiffs "an opportunity to be heard on their claimed right to a dissolution
of their marriages"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (finding that a statutory prohibition of welfare
benefits to residents of less than one year impaired the fundamental right of interstate movement); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (finding a Virginia poll tax to be unconstitutional because the
tax infringes on the fundamental right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that the right to
use the courts included the right of an indigent criminal defendant to be provided with a trial transcript by the state
when such a transcript is necessary for effective appellate review).
251. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 225 (explaining that because the individual interest affected by decisions
to detain has never been deemed a "fundamental interest" for equal protection purposes, the detention must only
pass a rational basis analysis).
252. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,265-68 (1977) (deter-
mining that several factors for showing a discriminatory intent in enacting legislation include: (I) The specific
sequence of events leading up to the challenged regulation or legislation, (2) departures from normal legislative pro-
cedures, (3) the ignoring of factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker, (4) the act's legislative or
administrative history, and (5) testimony by legislators); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,240 (1948) (holding
that racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause exists only where it is a product of a
discriminatory purpose); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1944) (finding that the element of intentional or pur-
poseful discrimination, necessary in a claim of denial of equal protection, may be proven by extrinsic evidence, but
is not presumed).
253. See supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text (discussing the standard for bringing an equal protection
claim).
254. "Facially neutral" means that on the face of the statute there is nothing that appears to disadvantage a
minority class of people. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 242 (explaining that a statute is discriminatory if, on its
face, it disadvantages racial or ancestral minorities); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351, 373-74 (1886)
(finding a local ordinance prohibiting the operation of a laundry not located in a brick or stone building without the
consent of the board of supervisors to be facially neutral, but invalidating the ordinance based on the discriminatory
administration of the statute).
255. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (finding a statute changing the city boundaries
for voting purposes from a square to a 28-sided figure, which eliminated almost all African-American voters from
the city, to be racially motivated).
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Alternatively, a petitioner may attempt to prove that there has been selective
enforcementF 6 of the regulation. In order to prove selective enforcement, a petitioner
would have to prove that either a police department policy or the policy of the
arresting officer, "had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose." To prove a discriminatory effect, the petitioner would have
to show that "similarly situated individuals of a different race" were not stopped for
violating the traffic regulation.258 If a petitioner sought to prove this, he would have
to. show the officer's motivation in stopping the vehicle.29 The petitioner would
likely have to rely on statistics unless a police officer or police department admitted
to a selective enforcement policy. If the petitioner relied on statistics, he would be
limited to using statistics from the jurisdiction in which the petitioner brought the
claim.2 ° The petitioner would bear the burden of using the statistics to show that
other individuals that could have been stopped for turning without signaling were not
stopped.261 Even if a court finds a discriminatory purpose, the government can simply
256. "Selective enforcement" occurs when the application of a regulation is based on an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962).
257. See id. (holding that some selectivity in applying the West Virginia recidivist statute was not an equal
protection violation without selection deliberately based on unjustifiable standards such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification).
258. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996) (holding that a defendant must show that
the government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races in order to be entitled to discovery
on a claim of selective prosecution).
259. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,292-97 (1987) (holding that the "Baldus study," statistics from
across the state of Georgia showing that African-Americans are sentenced to death more often than whites, cannot
prove a discriminatory purpose with regard to the defendant's death sentence because the statistics did not prove
that the defendant's jury acted with a discriminatory purpose).
260. See id. at 295-96 n.15 (asserting that "any inference from statewide statistics to a prosecutorial 'policy'
is of doubtful relevance").
261. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487; see United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1994)
(determining that to establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution of a statute outlawing voting more than
once, the defendants must show that they had been singled out based on an impermissible factor such as race and
that similarly situated individuals had not been prosecuted for similar conduct); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d
52, 59-60 (2nd Cir. 1992) (finding that the defendant had not proven that he had been singled out for prosecution
for unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported based on his membership to a terrorist organi-
zation); United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1172, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant, who was
charged with violating the Hobbs Act for "knowingly and willfully attempting to affect interstate commerce by
extortion under color of his position as a city councilman .... did not point to any evidence that others similarly
situated were not prosecuted"); C.F_. Carlson, Inc. v. Securities Exch. Comm'n, 859 F.2d 1429, 1437-38 (10th Cir.
1988) (opining that the petitioners, who were charged with violating federal securities fraud laws for borrowing
funds to purchase the minimum number of shares necessary to close public offering of common stock and then
repaying the loans with proceeds from the offering, were unable to show that others similarly situated were not sub-
jected to enforcement proceedings); United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that
the defendant, an FBI agent charged with submitting false reimbursement vouchers to his employer, "offered
nothing beyond pure speculation showing discrimination by or improper influence on the independent agency which
made the decision to prosecute"); United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th Cir. 1985) (determining that
there was no evidence that the defendant, who was charged with kidnaping, "was singled out for prosecution
because of his race").
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put forth its own statistics which demonstrate that similarly situated individuals of
another race were also stopped for turning without signaling. 2
Because a petitioner in the hypothetical would be unlikely to meet the standards
for a court to use a strict scrutiny test in analyzing the traffic regulation, the decision
to detain need only bear some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.26 3 In
the case of a "Whren stop," the legitimate public purpose would be traffic safety.2
Once the legislature has determined the standards for ensuring traffic safety, a
decision by a police officer to detain a motorist in order to enforce traffic safety regu-
lations would undoubtedly bear a fair relationship to the purpose of ensuring traffic
safety.
Therefore, the government would probably get around an equal protection claim
involving the hypothetical traffic stop. Although the Equal Protection Clause exists
to ensure equal application of the laws, in the area of traffic violations its shield is
unlikely to protect minorities from police harassment. Therefore, the Court's sug-
gestion that minorities would be protected by the Equal Protection Clause seems
empty.
V. SOLUTIONS FOR POTENTIAL ABUSES UNDER WHREN
Given the possible problems with the broad discretion that Whren imparts to the
police, a discussion of alternatives that are available to limit potential abuse is
necessary. Short of overruling Whren, there is no viable solution to the problem of
police using a minor traffic violation to stop a motorist if one of the officer's
intentions is to harass a vehicle's occupants or to conduct a search for which the
officer does not have the requisite probable cause. Whren allows a police officer to
stop a vehicle lawfully once the officer observes a minor traffic violation even if the
officer's real reason for stopping the vehicle is because the driver is a minority, has
long hair, or somehow looks suspicious.
However, rules may be formulated to limit potential abuse of Whren by police
officers in situations where a police officer intends to use a minor traffic violation to
enhance the officer's chances of finding a reason to search the vehicle and its
occupants. The way to prevent this abuse is to take away the officer's incentive of
stopping the vehicle in the first place.
To circumvent this problem, legislators should pass a law that would require a
police officer to issue a citation every time an officer stops an automobile. Such a
262. See Johnson, supra note 55, at 225 (asserting that the minimal scrutiny in equal protection cases
"dovetails with the definitional requirements of probable cause and reasonable suspicion since it allows
consideration of any statistically relevant information").
263. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955) (determining that an Oklahoma statute
which made it unlawful for anyone but a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit or duplicate eyeglasses could
be upheld for the legitimate purpose of protecting health and safety).
264. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 nA0 (1979) (holding that ensuring
subway passenger safety was a legitimate public purpose).
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law would require police officers not only to observe a traffic violation which
justifies a seizure, but to take the time to issue a citation once the vehicle is stopped.
This may cause a police officer to think twice before stopping a vehicle for failing
to use a turn signal and to stop only vehicles in which the driver has committed a
more serious traffic offense. This is because the officer would have to justify the stop
with a citation and, instead of taking a quick look into the car, the officer would have
to take time filling out the necessary paper work.
In addition, such a rule would allow review of a particular officer's conduct. If
there was a citation for every stop, there would be a record which specifies how
many stops that officer made and the reasons why each motorist was stopped. This
would allow for review of whether an officer harasses certain groups of motorists by
providing specific statistics for that officer's stops. With such statistics, it would be
easier for a defendant to bring an equal protection claim and prove selective enforce-
ment of traffic laws by the defendant's arresting officer.2 65 Of course, the public
would have to tolerate this rule. A rule requiring a police officer to issue a citation
every time an officer stops an automobile would take away a motorist's hope of
talking an officer out of writing a ticket.
VI. CONCLUSION
The broad holding of Whren v. United States has effectively eliminated the
pretextual issue with regard to traffic stops. The effect is to afford police officers the
right to stop drivers of vehicles after the officer observes the driver commit any
minor traffic violation. Under Whren, it is irrelevant whether the officer stops the
driver because of the traffic violation itself or because the officer hopes to find evi-
dence of a more serious crime.
Until the Supreme Court limits the holding of Whren, the police have the oppor-
tunity to abuse their discretion and stop drivers based on almost any subjective pur-
pose.26 The potential for abuse by the police may be heightened in light of the
Court's recent decision in Maryland v. Wilson.'6 Therefore, legislation is needed to
protect against this abuse.
265. See supra Part IV.C. (discussing how an equal protection claim might be an inadequate avenue in traffic
stop cases).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the state trooper
had a legitimate basis for stopping the defendant's van after observing the defendant change lanes without
signaling).
267. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997). In Maryland v. Wilson, the Court held that, following a routine traffic stop, the
driver and all occupants can be ordered to exit the vehicle. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886. In vigorous dissent, Justice
Kennedy asserted that "[w]hen Whren is coupled with [Maryland v. Wilson], the Court put tens of millions of
passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police. If the command to exit were to become commonplace, the
Constitution would be diminished in a most public way." Id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268. See supra Part V (setting forth a legislative solution to potential abuse under Whren).
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The next time you drive your car, be careful to follow all of the rules and regu-
lations of the road. If you fail to follow one, you may find yourself at the side of the
road speaking to a police officer. If you do, do not bother claiming the Fourth
Amendment's protection because it might not be there.

